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… The requirements of the second paragraph of of the 60. The guarantees of access to an and tribunal previously established by law laid down in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter and, in particular, those which determine what constitutes a tribunal and how it is composed, represent the cornerstone of the right to a fair trial. (29) 61. …

… of the , which refers to access to an ‘ and ’ tribunal as one of the requirements linked to the fundamental right to an effective remedy. …

… of the Charter, that latter provision must be duly taken into consideration for the purposes of interpreting the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, in the same way as the case-law of the ECtHR on Article 6(1) ECHR. (35) To ensure that bodies which may be called upon to rule on questions concerning the application or interpretation of EU law are in a position to ensure such effective judicial protection, maintaining their independence is essential, as confirmed by the second paragraph of …

… That may, in particular, be the case where those courts are required, in accordance with their obligations, which are recalled in paragraphs 128 to 131 of the present judgment, to determine, in certain circumstances, whether they or the judges of whom they are composed or other judges or courts, called upon to rule on cases concerning EU law or which have ruled on them, satisfy the requirements arising from the second subparagraph of 19(1) TEU and of the relating to the …

… , and previous establishment by law of the courts and judges concerned. 202 In the second place, it should be noted that the terms thus used by the Polish legislature are, as stated in paragraph 140 of the present judgment concerning the national provisions called into question by the Commission in the context of the third complaint, closely linked to a series of questions raised by various Polish courts concerning the compliance with EU law and, more specifically, with …

… First, in judgments of 6 and 13 May 2021, the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative Court) found that the KRS did not offer sufficient guarantees of independence and that its level of dependence on the legislative and executive authorities was so high that it could not be irrelevant in assessing the question as to whether the judges it selects meet the objective requirements of and under of the . …

… If the application of the criteria laid down in paragraphs 132 to 154 of that judgment leads to the conclusion that a court is not and in accordance with of the , a national court must refrain from applying national provisions that confer jurisdiction on such a court. …

… Rather, the Court held that national law may not reserve exclusive jurisdiction to a court that does not meet the requirements of and required by of the . (68) It is also clear from the aforecited passages that the Court did not consider that any other national court that met those requirements would or should have had jurisdiction to rule on the matter. …

… In my view the text of points 2 and 3 of Article 107(1) of the amended Law on the organisation of the ordinary courts and of points 2 and 3 of Article 72(1) of the amended Law on the Supreme Court is so broad and imprecise as to be reasonably open to an interpretation that an examination by a judge of compliance with any of the requirements of the second subparagraph of 19(1) TEU and of the of an and tribunal previously established by law (138) may …

… The degree of its dependence on the legislative and executive powers in the performance of the tasks entrusted to it is, in turn, so high that it cannot be without significance for the assessment as to whether the judges selected by it meet the objective requirements ... of and under of the of Fundamental Rights.” INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 120. …

… Such assessment follows a two-step rule: (a) assessment of the degree of independence enjoyed by the NCJ in respect of the legislature and the executive in exercising the responsibilities attributed to it under national legislation, as the body empowered to ensure the independence of the courts and judges, since the independence of the NCJ will determine whether the judges which it selects will be capable of meeting the requirements of and arising from of the …

… of Fundamental Rights (judgment in C-585/18, §§ 139-140); (b) assessment of the circumstances in which the new judges of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court were appointed and the role of the Council in that regard (judgment in C-585/18, § 146)... 37. …

… The foregoing is the point of departure for assessing whether the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court (hereinafter ‘IDSN’) is an and tribunal within the meaning of of the and Article 6 of the Convention, and ... although this is not expressly assessed in the present case, whether it can be [considered] a court pursuant to domestic law. …

… of the of Fundamental Rights (judgment in C‑585/18, §§ 139‑140); (b) assessment of the circumstances in which the new judges of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court were appointed and the role of the Council in that regard (judgment in C‑585/18, § 146) ... 37. …

… Such assessment follows a two-step rule: (a) assessment of the degree of independence enjoyed by the National Council of the Judiciary in respect of the legislature and the executive in exercising the responsibilities attributed to it under national legislation, as the body empowered to ensure the independence of the courts and of the judiciary, as relevant when ascertaining whether the judges which it selects will be capable of meeting the requirements of and arising from …

… The foregoing is the point of departure for assessing whether the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court (hereinafter ‘IDSN’) is an and tribunal within the meaning of of the and Article 6 of the Convention, and ... although this is not expressly assessed in the present case, whether it can be [considered] a court pursuant to domestic law. …

… The degree of dependence on the executive and legislature was such that it could not be irrelevant in assessing the ability of the judges selected by it to meet the objective requirements of and required by of the of Fundamental Rights (see paragraph 178 below). Such composition of the NCJ undermined its ability to perform effectively its primary function of safeguarding the independence of judges and courts. 154. …

… of the of Fundamental Rights (judgment in C‑585/18, §§ 139‑140); (b) assessment of the circumstances in which the new judges of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court were appointed and the role of the Council in that regard (judgment in C‑585/18, § 146) ... 37. …

… The foregoing is the point of departure for assessing whether the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court (hereinafter ‘IDSN’) is an and tribunal within the meaning of of the and Article 6 of the Convention, and ... although this is not expressly assessed in the present case, whether it can be [considered] a court pursuant to domestic law. …

… The degree of dependence on the executive and legislature was such that it could not be irrelevant in assessing the ability of the judges selected by it to meet the objective requirements of and required by of the of Fundamental Rights (see paragraph 149 below). Such composition of the NCJ undermined its ability to perform effectively its primary function of safeguarding the independence of judges and courts. 124. …

… of the of Fundamental Rights (judgment in C‑585/18, §§ 139‑140); (b) assessment of the circumstances in which the new judges of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court were appointed and the role of the Council in that regard (judgment in C-585/18, § 146) ... 37. …

… The requests mainly concerned the question whether the newly established Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court of Poland satisfied, in the light of the circumstances in which it was formed and its members appointed, the requirements of and required under of the of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. …