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… and by in accordance with of the and Article 6 of the ECHR (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 July 2009, Der Grüne Punkt - Duales System Deutschland v Commission, C-385/07 P, EU:C:2009:456, paragraphs 177 to 179, and of 5 June 2012, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission, T-214/06, EU:T:2012:275, paragraphs 282 and 283). 214 According to the case-law, the sanction for a breach, by an EU Court, of its obligation to adjudicate within a reasonable …

… (1) of the Charter and is a right which the EU Courts must ensure is respected. …

… The Commission’s first decision (2002) 2 From October to December 2000, the Commission of the European Communities carried out a number of checks pursuant to CS at the premises of certain Italian undertakings engaged in the manufacture of concrete reinforcing bars, including the applicant, and at the premises of an association of undertakings, the Federazione Imprese Siderurgiche Italiane (Federation of Italian Steel Undertakings; ‘Federacciai’). …

… They maintained that the Disciplinary Chamber could not be regarded as an and by within the meaning of 45 of the Constitution, of the of Fundamental Rights and Article 6 of the Convention. 25. On 23 December 2019 M.G., the First President of the Supreme Court replied that the request of the applicant’s lawyers had been received on 20 December, while the case was to be heard on 23 December 2019. …

… The first sentence of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads as follows: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an and by .” Admissibility Applicability of Article 6 § 1 (a) The parties’ submissions 131. …

… The case concerns the applicant’s suspension from his judicial duties by the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court which, in the applicant’s submission, did not satisfy the requirements of an “ and by ”. He also claimed that the suspension had amounted to a breach of his right to respect for his private life and that the restriction on the said right had been applied for a purpose not prescribed by the Convention. …

… This conclusion was the starting point for its assessment of whether the Disciplinary Chamber could be considered an “ and by ”: “61. …

… The foregoing is the point of departure for assessing whether the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court (hereinafter ‘IDSN’) is an and within the meaning of of the and Article 6 of the Convention, and ... although this is not expressly assessed in the present case, whether it can be [considered] a court pursuant to domestic law. …

… It complained that the Civil Chamber that had dealt with its case had not been an “ and by ” and alleged a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2. The applicant company’s registered office is in Warsaw. It was represented by Mr D. Gliński, the Chairman of the Board. The applicant company had been granted legal aid in the proceedings before the Court and was represented by Ms M. Gąsiorowska and Ms J. …

… This conclusion was the starting point for its assessment of whether the Disciplinary Chamber could be considered an “ and by ”: “61. …

… The foregoing is the point of departure for assessing whether the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court (hereinafter ‘IDSN’) is an and within the meaning of of the and Article 6 of the Convention, and ... although this is not expressly assessed in the present case, whether it can be [considered] a court pursuant to domestic law. …

… They complained that the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court, which examined their appeals against the resolutions of the NCJ, had not been an “ and by ”. They alleged a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2. The applicants were born in 1979 and 1966 respectively and live in Siemianowice Śląskie and Lublin. They were represented by Ms S. Gregorczyk‑Abram and Ms M. …

… 40 The referring court considers that the answer to the questions thus addressed to it will depend, inter alia, on whether a judge appointed in such circumstances constitutes an and by , within the meaning of the second subparagraph of 19(1) TEU, Article 267 TFEU, the second subparagraph of of the , and Article 6(1) ECHR. 41 According to the referring court, the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, requires Member States …

… According to its wording, that question concerns, more specifically whether, taking those circumstances into account, that judge may be regarded as constituting an ‘ and previously by within the meaning of EU law’. 122 As regards those concepts, it follows from the first sentence of the second paragraph of of the , which reflects, in essence and as has already been noted in paragraph 102 of this judgment, the general principle of EU …

… and by to be able, in accordance with a procedure that fully safeguards the rights enshrined in and 48 of the , to review the validity of that decision and that of the decision not to adjudicate of a body such as the KRS concerning the challenge brought against that transfer decision. 121 In the present case, the referring court, seeks, in essence, as is apparent from paragraph 71 of the present judgment, to determine whether, in the context …

… This conclusion was the starting point for its assessment of whether the Disciplinary Chamber could be considered an “ and by ”: “61. …

… The foregoing is the point of departure for assessing whether the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court (hereinafter ‘IDSN’) is an and within the meaning of of the and Article 6 of the Convention, and ... although this is not expressly assessed in the present case, whether it can be [considered] a court pursuant to domestic law. …

… The applicant, who is a barrister, complained that the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court that dealt with her case had not been an and “ by ” and alleged a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. THE FACTS 2. The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Gdynia. Having been granted legal aid, she was represented by Ms M. Gąsiorowska, a lawyer practising in Warszawa. 3. …

… with regard to an and previously by , within the meaning of 19(1) TEU in conjunction with of the , since a legal prohibition relating to acts which are impossible would be wholly without normative merit. 159 According to the Republic of Poland, the right to an and previously by , guaranteed in of the , does not include the right for an individual to seek to challenge …

… U. of 2002, item 1269), as amended by the amending law (‘the amended Law relating to the administrative courts’), and 8 of the amending , which prohibit any national court from reviewing compliance with the EU requirements relating to an and previously by , the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the second subparagraph of 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with of the of Fundamental Rights of …

… K.’), held that of the Charter and Article 9(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16) must be interpreted as precluding cases concerning the application of EU from falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court which is not an and , within the meaning of of the . …

… OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL TANCHEV delivered on 6 May 2021(1) Case C-791/19 European Commission v Republic of Poland (Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - National measures a disciplinary regime for judges - Second subparagraph of 19(1) TEU - Rule of - Judicial - Definition of disciplinary offences - Examination by an and by - Reasonable time - Rights of the defence - and 48 of the …

… It follows that the requirement for the establishment of a disciplinary regime which guarantees the rights enshrined in and 48 of the Charter derives from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. 69. This analysis is also consistent with the case-law in which the Court has linked the guarantees of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and of the Charter. …

… The Republic of Poland contends that those rights arising from and 48 of the Charter do not derive from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, so the third and fourth complaints cannot be upheld. …

… The first sentence of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads as follows: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an and by .” The Chamber judgment 155. …

… Relying on these arguments, as well as on the decisions of the EFTA Court and the General Court of the EU as noted above (see paragraph 82 above), and on the previous findings of the Supreme Court regarding the irregularities in the procedure leading to the appointment of A.E. as a Court of Appeal judge (see the relevant judgments noted in paragraphs 67-75 above), the applicant claimed that he had been denied the right to a fair hearing before an and by …

… , as provided under Article 70 § 1 of the Constitution and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. …

… In the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an and by . … 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to . …’ B. EU 1. The 5. …

… Paragraph 2 of of the reads: ‘Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an and previously by . …’ 6. Under 48(1) of the Charter: ‘Everyone who has been charged shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.’ 2. Directive 2003/6 7. Article 12 of Directive 2003/6 provides: ‘1. …

… (c) Scope of the right to remain silent for the purposes of and 48 of the Charter 85. …